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Bank of New York vybrala od penzijného fondu štátu Virginia o 20 miliónov USD navyše pri podvodných menových konverziách. BNY poskytovala Virginii pri konverziách najhorší kurz daného dňa a rozdiel si nechala pre seba. Táto veľká banka je obvinená z podobných podvodov aj v štáte Florida a Kalifornia.

Človek si nemôže byť istý ani pri tých najväčších menách, že s ním bude zaobchádzané fér. Ku konfliktu záujmov môže prichádzať vždy, keď inštitúcia spravujúca vaše peniaze, obchoduje aj na vlastný účet.

Foto: arabianbusiness.com.

Súvisiace články :

1. Ako sa chrániť pred padajúcim dolárom
2. Pár otázok pred obchodovaním

Reinhartovci zistili, že reálne HDP je podstatne nižšie a nezamestnanosť vyššia desať rokov po kríze v porovnaní s desaťročím pred krízou. Toto obdobie uťahovania opaskov zvykne podľa nich trvať minimálne tak dlho ako obdobie expanzie pred krízou. Táto expanzia je často spôsobená nadmerným poskytovaním úverov a zvyšovaním zadlženia (pákového efektu).

Zdá sa teda, že na zotavenie ekonomík po súčasnej kríze si ešte nejaký ten rôčik počkáme.

English summary: Carmen Reinhart from the University of Maryland and Vincent Reinhart from the American Enterprise Institute publishes an interesting empirical study  After the Fall. They analysed the behavior of real GDP, unemployment, inflation, real estate prices etc 10 years prior to and 10 years after a major global or coutnry-specific crisis. E.g. they cover the 1929 stock market crash, oil shock from 1973, Japanese stock market crash from the 90s or the most recent financial crisis.

The Reinharts presented evidence that the real GDP is significantly lower and the unemployment substantially higher 10 years after the crisis than 10 years prior to it. This retrenchment period tends to last at least as long as the expansion prior to the crisis. The boom is very often caused by expansion in credit and increasing leverage.

It seems that we will have to wait some time till it’s over with the retrenchment period.

Via Clusterstock.

Súvisiace články :

1. Prečo trhy krachujú (Why Markets Crash)

V rozhovore Fama tak isto uviedol, že obrovské prepady na akciových trhoch nie sú argumentom proti teórii efektívnych trhov. Táto teória tvrdí, že ceny aktív na trhu (napr. akcií) obsahujú všetky dostupné informácie. Ak by trhy neboli efektívne, videli by sme okolo seba množstvo ľudí, ktorí dokážu zhodnotiť svoje investície lepšie ako je trhový výnos. V skutočnosti je takýchto ľudí nepatrné množstvo, ktorým sa to podarilo náhodou.

English summary: I strongly recommend to watch the discussion with Eugene Fama from the University of Chicago, one of the fathers of modern finance, on the theory of efficient markets and the financial reform in the USA. Professor Fama considers the current financial reform a bad idea. He personally would let the ‘too big to fail’ banks fail. Bailing them out does not belong to the arsenal of capitalist policies. On the contrary, it is a state intervention into the free market enabling the banks to behave irresponsibly.

Moreover, he mentioned that the current volatility is not a case against the efficient market theory. This theory contends that the asset prices (e.g. stock prices) contain all available information. No one can therefore beat the market with publicly available information as this information is already included in the prices. If markets were inefficient we would see a vast number of people beating the markets. Yet, the reality is a bit different. We do not see such people.

Via Greg Mankiw’s blog.

Súvisiace články :

1. Fama and French on Semi-Variance (Fama a French o semivariancii)
2. Eugene Fama interview
3. My Life in Finance

English summary: Nice comparison of public debts to the GDP of G7 countries and emerging market economies. For example Japan’s public debt climbed to 192.1%, China’s indebtedness amounts to 18.2% and Russia’s to 6.9%.

Súvisiace články :

1. Sovereign Debt Default Risk Declines Significantly
2. Grécke mýty a tragédia eura (Greek Myths and the Euro Tragedy)
3. US Debt Clock

The Wall Street Journal

Cochrane sa zameriava najmä na tvrdenia, ktorými politici ospravedlňujú obrovskú pomoc Grécku:

1. Záchrana eura – Cohrane prirovnáva štáty k podnikom. Ak skrachuje niekoľko podnikov, s menou sa nič nedeje. Nič by sa v súčasnej situácii bez fiškálnej únie nestalo, keby pár štátov skrachovalo. Gréckom by to mohlo začať. V tejto súvisloti Cochrane hodnotí kritéria Paktu rastu a stability ako škodlivé a navrhuje, aby sa zrušili a aby sa jasne povedalo, že žiadna krajina nebude zachraňovaná pomocou iných.
2. Nákaza – Cochrane sa neobáva, že by sa krach Grécka preniesol na Portugalsko, Španielsko a ostatné dubiózne štáty. To jediné, čo by sme sa po gréckom krachu dozvedeli o financiách spomenutých krajín je fakt, či ich EU bude zachraňovať, alebo nie. Ak by každý dopredu vedel, že žiadne záchranné akcie nebudú, nebude ani žiadna nákaza.
3. Systémové riziko – krach Grécka by podľa Cochranea v žiadnom prípade neohrozil finančný systém. V jeho prípade totiž nejde o žiadne nové finančné produkty, pákové efekty, či mysteriózne deriváty. Ide o obyčajný štátny dlh. Nič nové. Krachom Grécka by niekoľko ľudí prišlo o peniaze a tým by to haslo. Gréci boli posledných takmer 200 rokov polovicu času v defaulte a s finančným systémom sa nič nestalo.
4. Záchrana bánk - chicágsky profesor sa pozastavuje nad faktom, že takmer 2 roky po problémoch s hypotékami a na ne naviazanými toxickými cennými papiermi si obrovská armáda európskych regulátorov nevšimla, že množstvo bánk vsadilo na grécky dlh. Viac regulácie teda sotva prinesie väčšiu ochranu pre investorov. Navrhuje, aby sa zachránili len tie najdôležitejšie banky, keď to je naozaj nutné, ale nie všetky a každý držitel gréckych dlhopisov.

Cochrane záverom volá po razantnom skresaní vládnych výdavkov a zameraní sa na rast hospodárstva, pretože len tak môžu štáty splatiť svoje dlhy. Upozorňuje ale, že rast nepochádza z míňania, najmä nie z výdavkov na štedré penzie a platy vládnych úradníkov. Grécke míňanie vo výške viac ako 50% HDP totiž neviedlo k rastu a plným kufrom peňazí.

English summary (taken from the original article): Last week the Greek bailout ballooned into a gargantuan 750 billion euro (nearly $1 trillion) debt stabilization fund, including a $39 billion line of credit from the International Monetary Fund. It won’t work. Barring a fiscal and growth miracle, we will either see sovereign defaults (larger and more chaotic for having been postponed) or the ECB will have to print euros to buy worthless debt, leading to widespread inflation.

The reasoning behind the Greek bailout is founded on several myths that need exploding:

1. Allowing Greece to default, or to renegotiate with bondholders, would be the best way to save the euro. A currency union is strongest without fiscal union. Then
   countries are no different from companies. If they borrow and cannot pay back, investors lose money. The currency is unaffected. Moreover, it should be clearly stated that no country will be bailed out and there should be no limits on budget deficits or levels of debt.
2. Contagion – We’re told that a Greek default will lead to “contagion.” The only thing an investor learns about Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian finances from a Greek default is whether the EU will or won’t bail them out too. If everyone knew there wouldn’t be bailouts there would be no contagion.
3. Systemic risk – Greece has no millions of complex swap contracts, no obscure derivatives, no intertwined counterparties.  There isn’t even any collateral to dispute or assets to seize. This isn’t new finance, it’s plain-vanilla sovereign debt.  People who lent money will lose some of it. Period.
4. Saving the banks – We’re told that Greece must be bailed out, or large banks will fail. Apparently, two years after the great mortgage meltdown, Europe’s army of bank regulators missed the fact that large, “systemically important” banks had made firm-threatening bets on Greek debt. So much for the idea that more regulation will keep complex banks out of trouble.

The only way to solve the underlying euro-zone fiscal mess is to slash government spending and to focus on growth. Countries only pay off debts by growing out of them. And no, growth does not come from spending, especially on generous pensions and padded government payrolls. Greece’s spending over 50% of GDP did not result in robust growth and full coffers.

Žiadne súvisiace články.

Pravda je taká, že zlato má v priemysle oproti iným komoditám len veľmi malé využitie. Na rozdiel od akcií nevypláca žiadne dividendy, alebo úroky, ako je tomu pri dlhopisoch. Pri zlate nie je ani žiadna ochrana ako pri bankových vkladoch. Okrem toho je s ním spojená vysoká volatilita – laicky povedané, jeho cena kolíše napríklad ako cena akcií. Nejedná sa teda o žiadnu bezpečnú investíciu.

Od roku 1972 do roku 2001 narástla cena zlata len o 336,5%, čo je len o niečo viac ako inflácia za to isté obdobie v USA (323,7%). Za to isté obdobie – 29 rokov – narástla hodnota akciového indexu S&P 500 o 2 466%.

S kúpou skutočného (fyzického) zlata sú spojené aj vysoké transakčné náklady. Investori platia niekoľlko percent nad trhovú cenu pri nákupe zlatých tehál, no pri kúpe zlatých mincí môžu investori preplatiť zlato až o 35%. To isté platí pre predaj.

Zlato je skôr nástroj na špekuláciu ako prostriedok na dlhodobú investíciu. Investori by sa nedopustili žiadnej chyby, keby ho zo svojho portfólia úplne vyradili.

Zdroj: Businessweek.com.

English summary (taken from the original article): As an investment, gold has never been more popular. Gold spot prices hit a record of $1,243.10 per ounce in Comex trading on May 12 before slipping $13.90, or 1.1 percent, to $1,230.10 on May 13. In the past three years, the precious metal is up 84 percent. On May 13, a vending machine that dispenses gold bars was unveiled at Abu Dhabi’s Emirates Palace hotel. Financial experts warn that all this enthusiasm for gold could be a warning sign—that gold prices could be near their peak. But even if gold keeps rising there are several features of gold that make it treacherous for individual investors, financial advisers say.

Gold might have a reputation as a “safe haven,” but nothing could be further from the truth. Unlike other commodities, gold has few industrial uses. Unlike businesses owned through the stock market, gold earns no profits and doesn’t pay out dividends. Unlike bonds, no one pays interest to holders of gold. And, unlike insured bank deposits, there is no guarantee of your principal investment.

Gold’s record as an inflation hedge is more mixed over the long term. Because gold fell from 1980 to 2001, the metal’s total appreciation from 1972 to 2001 was just 336.5 percent. That barely beats inflation over those 29 years of 323.7 percent, and is way behind the 2,466 percent return of the broad Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index if dividends are included.

There are practical problems with owning gold, as well. It’s heavy, and not easy for the average investor to buy, sell, ship, and store. Moreover, the transactional cost related to buying and selling physical gold are significant. The markups can reach up to 35%.

As a result, investors would not be worse off without gold in their portfolios. Gold rather a short-term speculation vehicle than a long-term investment.

Súvisiace články :

1. Does Gold Belong in My Portfolio? (Patrí zlato do portfólia?)
2. Výkonnosť podielových fondov a poplatky (On Mutual Funds Returns and Fees)
3. Cloning of Mutual Funds (Klonovanie podielových fondov)

A nedokázali to ani dlhopisové trhy pred vypuknutím prvej i druhej svetovej vojny. Do poslednej chvíle nevykazovali žiadne náznaky blížiaceho sa konfliktu. No po vypuknutí oboch vojen sa ceny štátnych dlhopisov zrútili (pozri tu a tu)…

English summary (taken from the original article):
Oddly there’s little agreement amongst the experts about why markets crash. Although given that experts in fields without objective measures of success are generally less accurate than a drunk in a ship’s urinal during a storm that’s not really surprising. Still, if the best that the world of investment has to offer doesn’t know when stuff’s overvalued then how can we possibly hope for an end to boom and bust?

Irving Fisher, who stated that “stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau” with the uncanny precision of the general whose last words were “don’t be stupid, they’ll never hit me from over th …” is largely remembered for that most infelicitous of predictions. Yet Fisher is one of the greatest economists of the twentieth century and a pioneer of behavioural finance.

If it was difficult, if not impossible, to foresee the Wall Street Crash what about something a bit more obvious? Like, say, the two World Wars? We all know the history, about how they were more or less inevitable. Only the data says differently.

Niall Ferguson’s analysis of government bond markets on the lead into the First World War suggests that either markets completely failed to predict the “obvious” slide into conflict or that the war itself was far from certain until the last possible moment. The subsequent devastation to bond prices makes it hard to believe that investors wouldn’t have reacted if they’d realised that war was inevitable…

Žiadne súvisiace články.